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This issue features Part II of the Antitrust Law Journal's Symposium
on Antitrust at the Millennium. As with Part I, which appeared in Volume
68, Issue 1 (2000), most Symposium authors use a decision or other
significant text from antitrust's past as a springboard to discuss some
aspect of antitrust's future. This group of Symposium essays is being
published in the wake of a U.S. election that has shifted control of
the Executive Branch of the federal government from Democrats to
Republicans. Yet the broad themes and challenges pursed by Symposium
authors are likely to remain central to antitrust regardless of turns in
electoral fortunes.
One theme that emerges from these essays is the central role of economic analysis in antitrust today. Timothy J. Muris examines how antitrust's contemporary engagement with economics began in 1977, with
the Supreme Court's landmark GTE Sylvania decision. While many commentators have viewed Sylvania and the major Chicago School-oriented
decisions that follow as a triumph of economic theory, Muris argues that
the enduring feature of Sylvania is the significant role played by empirical
economic evidence in grounding the Court's decision to overrule
Schwinn. Thomas E. Kauper's essay on the Justice Department's LTV/
Republic Steel merger investigation also notes how antitrust doctrine has
evolved during the past quarter century to encourage a realistic appraisal
of the economic consequences of business practices. Kauper's wideranging discussion goes beyond the immediate problem of that particular
steel merger-the relevance of globalization in assessing the likelihood
of anticompetitive effects-to explain why antitrust has declined to
accept the invitation to promote national champions in the service of
international competitiveness
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Two essays address whether antitrust should pay more attention to
non-economic values that were important in shaping doctrine during
the pre-Sylvania past. Robert H. Lande sees a role for a revived incipiency
doctrine in horizontal merger analysis, as a way to take into account a
concern for protecting consumer choice. Stephen F. Ross highlights a
different concern-to protect the non-economic value of equal economic opportunity by ensuring that rivals have a meaningful chance to
compete with a dominant firm. While both authors see limitations in
antitrust's thoroughgoing focus on economic values, they seek to protect
potential victims on opposite sides of the market: buyers (at least, enduse consumers) for Lande, and small sellers for Ross. Each of these
critics concedes a great deal to the economic approach to antitrust. Ross
proposes that courts look to a non-economic value only as a tie-breaker
when the economic analysis is indeterminate, and Lande notes that
much of what he seeks to accomplish by promoting greater attention
to consumer choice could be understood as advancing an efficiency
consideration to which insufficient attention has been paid in the past.
Another message of these Symposium essays is that there is a wide
degree of consensus among commentators across the political spectrum
in favor of what might be called the core of antitrust: aggressive civil
and criminal enforcement against collusive conduct in traditional per
se categories (price fixing and market division), and skepticism about
mergers among rivals that raise concentration substantially in markets
where new competition (entry) is unlikely. When there is economic
debate about horizontal practices, it is on the periphery of this core, as
with Michael G. Vita's skeptical look at the future of enforcement actions
against unilateral acts that might facilitate coordination, on the model
of the FTC's unsuccessful Ethyl case.
But if there is consensus on the economic harm from practices at
antitrust's core, there remains debate about the structure of the legal
rules that should regulate those practices. Joseph Kattan addresses this
topic in his essay about the role of bright line standards like "quick
look" rules and presumptions under Sherman Act Section 1. Such rules
structure the rule of reason analysis by limiting judicial consideration
of certain types of evidence. Kattan focuses on the type of truncated
analysis at issue in Indiana Federation of Dentists and California Dental
Association, under which evidence of actual harm to competition may
preclude judicial consideration of evidence of potential harm (based
on market structure). The essay highlights the possibility that a quick
look approach will result in the condemnation of business practices that
would appear beneficial upon a full analysis of their effects on
competition.
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While there is substantial consensus within the antitrust community
about the appropriate treatment of collusive practices, there is more
division with respect to exclusionary conduct, whether that behavior
takes the form of vertical agreements (between firms and their suppliers
or customers) or single firm monopolization. There is little dispute as
to economic theory: exclusionary conduct could allow firms to create or
maintain market power, but such practices could equally permit firms
to obtain a wide range of efficiencies. The disagreement concerns the
difficulty of evaluating practices that appear, simultaneously, to have
prospects of both harming competition and promoting it. The essay by
Dennis W. Carlton, which uses Aspen Skiing and Kodak as a springboard,
combines a clear recognition of the competitive dangers from exclusion
with a strong skepticism about the ability of courts and enforcers to
perform the policy tradeoff successfully. Carlton concludes that antitrust
enforcement should be reserved for the clearest cases of harm to competition.
These essays also provide a window into the challenges-and opportunities-antitrust faces over the next decade. One such challenge arises
from antitrust's success. As other nations have come to embrace competition policy and have put antitrust enforcement schemes into place, the
potential for conflict among multiple sovereigns, and the burden on
firms seeking to comply with the mandates of multiple jurisdictions,
have expanded dramatically. William E. Kovacic highlights this problem
in his discussion of the tensions between antitrust enforcers in the United
States and the European Union over the evaluation of Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas. To reduce the potential for conflict, he
proposes ways to increase the transparency of regulatory decision making. Harry First, in his essay, suggests one possible solution that avoids
the use of binding mechanisms to resolve cases that affect the concerns of
multiple jurisdictions. First instead looks to the example of the successful
prosecution of international cartels, exemplified by the Vitamins case,
as a model for broader international coordination.
Another challenge facing antitrust relates to the interplay between
antitrust law and intellectual property law. With the growth of the "new
economy," antitrust enforcement has increasingly grappled with the relative roles of competition policy and intellectual property law in promoting innovation. The increase in cases on the antitrust/intellectual
property interface primarily reflects changes in the economy over the
past decade, not recent changes in antitrust. For example, an essay
published in Part I of this Symposium shows how theJustice Department's
evaluation of a software merger during the Bush, Sr. AdministrationBorland's proposed acquisition of Ashton-Tate-confronted many of the
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issues that have preoccupied antitrust during the Clinton Administration:
innovation competition, network effects, the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights, and the like. But over a quarter of a century,
antitrust's approach to intellectual property has been totally transformed,
as is made clear in Willard K. Tom's contemporary assessment of the
FIC's 1975 Xerox consent decree. Nevertheless, the high-tech marketplace continues to pose challenges for antitrust. Robert Pitofsky questions
a more recent Xerox case, a Federal Circuit decision from the past year.
Pitofsky sees this decision as fraught with unfortunate potential to undermine the traditional balance between competition and intellectual property in promoting innovation, by allowing the invocation of intellectual
property rights to trump competition policy concerns. Richard Posner's
concerns about antitrust in the new economy are not with doctrine but
with the administrative capacity of governmental institutions. Posner
emphasizes the need to provide courts and enforcement agencies with
the technical resources needed to keep up with a complex and rapidly
changing business sector.
The remaining three essays address a range of significant topics. Stephen Calkins celebrates antitrust amicus briefs and sets forth a taxonomy
of the roles such briefs can play. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro consider
the analysis of efficiencies in evaluating the competitive consequences
of proposed horizontal mergers. They distinguish simple scale economies
from efficiencies that require the close integration of specific, hard-totrade assets owned by merger partners, and suggest that simple scale
economies are unlikely to be simultaneously merger-specific and large
enough to benefit consumers. Finally, William Kolasky raises an issue that
has remained important notwithstanding the deregulation movement of
the 1980s: the interplay between the general-purpose antitrust enforcement agencies and industry-specific regulators. Kolasky's particular concern is with the disparate approaches to review of telecommunications
mega-mergers by the Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission. Based on his review of regulatory treatment of the
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech mergers, Kolasky expresses a
strong preference for the DOJ approach.
As a group, these Symposium essays set the agenda for antitrust at the
start of a new millennium. They also emphasize how antitrust's past
remains a fertile starting point for addressing the challenges to come.

